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A Case for Deception in the Defense 
SPENCER R. CALDER, Department of the Army 
Cyber deception may be used fairly easily in a contested cyberspace to impose disproportionate operational cost to adversarial 
actors. Concepts of what comprise a legitimate defensive effort in cyberspace are changing. The concept of a rigid perimeter 
defense as a panacea are increasingly viewed as a fallacy. “Sovereign” cyberspaces are increasingly contested. Concurrently to 
these trends, the Department of Defense is moving toward standardization and homogenization of cyberspace that may 
facilitate enemy operation in our spaces. Military deception doctrine has been used successfully in conflict through the history 
of warfare in contested spaces and may provide a useful taxonomy to advance this discussion. Civil society has developed 
several tools that may afford an easy implementation of deception via existing infrastructure. Honeypots, tokens, and moving 
target defense may be more widely adopted today to sow ambiguity in adversary operations. Deliberate development of a 
deceptive capability could afford the ability to actually mislead our adversaries. 
 
“It is now widely recognized that traditional approaches to cyber defense have been 
inadequate.”i - Kristen Heckman, et al. 
 
The Joint Information Environment (JIE) Operational Concept puts forth five imperatives in 
cyber-defense: to “protect, detect, characterize, counter[act], and mitigate”ii adversarial activity. 
The US government is severely challenged to meet this imperative. Protection, mitigation, 
counteraction and even detection, are problematic via current defensive means. US government 
cybersecurity efforts today can be categorized as fairly narrow. A recent MITRE study intones 
military departments have only one effective strategy – incident response.iii The community of 
practice commonly views security in binary terms; strategies are tested and bureaucratically 
palatable to the CIOs. Webroot – a cybersecurity consultancy – observed this year that 97 
percent of exploitive software – malware – they detected was host specific. “Host specificity” 
counteracts current defensive strategies that “fingerprint” (i.e. create signatures for) malware. 
This makes exploitation significantly harder to detect, counter, and mitigate using our existing 
strategy.iv In order to provide for effective defense of institutional footholds in cyberspace, 
security must move past practices that are bureaucratically inexpensive. Cybersecurity must 
strive to be robust in the statistical sense, guarding against unforeseen threat vectors, and 
oriented towards the most acceptable outcomes. Instead of serving the CIO’s “rate of detection” 
metrics, cybersecurity must be oriented towards success supporting national military objectives, 
in and through cyberspace. Despite the categorization of network defensive strategy as defense in 
depth, DoD Cybersecurity Providers increasingly pursue a limited set of tactics in support of 
bureaucratic aims.  
 
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate the utility of including deception in cyber-defense 
doctrine, and to explore the benefits of its implementation. This study is designed for 
policymakers and cyber-professionals of all US Government entities to assist in formulation of 
new strategy. This paper will examine cyberspace and security broadly, highlight emerging 
concepts, and use military deception parlance to frame them. It is the belief of the author that 
defensive deception is a capability worth pursuing and that through the implementation of a 
defensive deception capability, we may impose disproportionate cost to adversarial decision-
making. 
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1. Strategic Imperative 
Currently US information and communication technology operates in a confederation of separate 
enclaves, pursuing security only at our perimeters. This is changing; however, what the changes 
mean has yet to be seen. As early as 2010, the communications community began to coalesce 
around the idea of a “Joint Information Environment”v (JIE). This environment was meant to 
simplify operation and defense of the systems supporting DoD operations. Through moving 
away from localized operation, maintenance, and defense into a single converged framework, the 
JIE ultimately converged control and cut cost. Several core services began to collapse into 
operation by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). It began with authentication 
services, web-portals, and eventually interdepartmental email.  
 
The most pertinent to this discussion are the proposed changes to the DoD’s security 
architecture. The JIE Single Security Architecture (SSA), which includes Joint Regional Security 
Stacks(JRSS), is a grouping of sensors that use “fingerprinting” to detect and proactively block 
malware. While this does protect US government cyber-geography as pointed out previously, it’s 
efficacy is increasingly challenged. Malware is adapting to bypass this methodology. Moreover, 
it relies on previous execution and detection of the malware to perform its job. This may not 
seem vital, but attackers favor undiscovered exploits when stakes are high. That is to say, in a 
war, the JRSS won’t be of much use. Further still, under JIE’s proposed SSA, the Departments 
(i.e. Army, Air Force, and Navy) will collapse into a jointly managed architecture. The outward 
appearance of improved security may be deceptive. In its effort to make an effective, clear, and 
unambiguous operating environment for joint management, it will have the same effect for 
adversarial actors. In pursuit of the best business case, the DoD set prime conditions for 
exploitation of US networks.  
 
2. Human behavior is human behavior, even in cyberspace. 
We bring with us the complexity of human behavior everywhere we go. It is only appropriate to 
recognize that we are bringing this baggage with us into cyberspace.1 As humans begin to clarify 
our relation to cyberspace it seems reasonable to extend our normative behaviors into this new 
realm. In so doing, we may realize a more effective defense of our social apparatus in cyberspace. 
Using deception and manipulation in cyberspace as we do in the physical world can afford 
operational benefit to all domains.  
 
“The renunciation of false opinions [may] be a renunciation of life, a negation of life. . . untruth 
[I]S a condition of life” – Friedrich Nietzschevi 
 
Although deception is generally a much-maligned facet of human communication, what 
Nietzsche asserted in “Beyond Good and Evil” as a “condition of life” is essential in the context 
of war. What serves a multitude of purpose in everyday social context, from saving face to 
influencing others’ behavior, serves much the same in war. Ruses, feints, and other deception 
have been used since man started waging war to further our aims on the battlefield and now 
commercial cybersecurity providers are using it as well. Study of this behavior is fairly 
widespread in its broader social context; in cyberspace, it has been generally lacking.  
                                                          
1 Like JP 3-14 or Psychological frameworks 
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According to a survey of cyberdeception literature done by the MITRE corporation in 2012, 
there were only a few dozen studies on deception in cyberspace at the time, and of those, few 
used pertinent sociological descriptors.2 Since 2012, however, there has been an uptick in notable 
network deception studies. After their initial assessment of the field of study, the MITRE team 
pursued its research, augmenting the body of research done by the US Naval Postgraduate 
School. In this course of study, MITRE conducted a cyber deception game, and pursued design 
of a framework for planning active deception.  
 
3. Trends in Cyberdefense 
Private sector efforts have been diverging from the fingerprinting of malware and defining 
heuristic characteristics for over three years.vii Corporations have shifted from a sole focus on 
building alarm systems and triggers (i.e. perimeter defense) to detect intrusions – which are 
being bypassed, as noted above – to more broad efforts to mitigate vulnerability across the whole 
“cyber-kill-chain”. Some, like the Vulnerability Rewards Program (VRP), are aimed at finding 
and fixing vulnerabilities before they are exploited. VRPs have grown exponentially since 2009, 
including to the DoD in March 2016. Other efforts in the sector employ deception, intended to 
manipulate adversary behavior, diverting attention from critical systems to non-critical systems 
or intentionally feed adversaries disinformation. Others, like the “Moving Target Defense”viii 
seek to create a rapidly changing geography for the adversary to operate in. Conceptually, 
deception in cyberspace has been discussed since roughly the mid-1990s, originally in the form 
of the “honeypot,” but has increasingly morphed into more complex forms, garnering increasing 
attention over the last few years. In 2013, MITRE attempted creation of an integrated defensive 
deception platform called “Blackjack,” however, testing demonstrated some difficulties with 
real-world use. Since 2013 more attention has been focused on the concept. The topic was 
presented in three major computer conferences in 2015, as it is increasingly being viewed as a 
tenable defensive strategy. In the private sector, deception has made a convincing business case. 
Cymmetria, established in 2015, is comprised of numerous military and security professionals 
with backgrounds ranging from a Vice President of Kaspersky, to various prior service members 
of the Israeli Defense Force Unit 8200, a unit analogous to the US National Security Agency. 
The question posed to the DoD today isn’t “does this have value,” but rather, “can we leverage 
this concept?” 
 
4. Military deception as a framework 
This linkage with state security apparatuses isn’t by chance alone – deception is frequently key 
to victory. Military forces are regular practitioners of deception in war, because its use can prove 
decisive. The Achaeans (Greeks) famously used subterfuge to decisively end the siege of Troy. 
World War Two included a massive deception campaign, planned by Allied Forces to assist the 
western offensive against German forces. This linkage with military success has ensured a robust 
relationship through time. The DoD has codified it in Joint Publication 3-13.4 “Military 
Deception.” Each use, changed the tempo and focus of enemy forces, allowing the deceiver to 
gain the initiative.  
 
                                                          
2 This study has been the foundation of a series of studies into cyberdeception by the MITRE corporation. 
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Military deception “is intended to deter hostile actions, [or] increase the success of friendly 
defensive actions.”ix Deception imposes cost on the adversary, cost in detecting the lie, cost in 
incorrect action, or cost of exposed intent. Friendly operations are valuable as they impose 
additional impediment to adversary operations. Deception has been used in military operations 
since at least the time of Homer - roughly three thousand years ago. Militaries have used ruses 
and other measures to both deny information to the enemy and to feed them bad information so 
as to disrupt their decision cycle. The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), in its seminal study of 
deception, identified two major branches of deception to achieve these aims: “Ambiguity 
increasing” deception, or “A-type,” and “Misleading” deception, or “M-Type,” deception.x  
 
A historic example of A-Type cited by the NPS study was Operation Fortitude North.3 xi  In 
this case the US attempted to obfuscate the intended landing site for the invasion of mainland 
Europe (i.e. Operation Overlord) and impose dispersal of defensive forces. This was 
accomplished by signaling possible invasions of Norway, Romania, and France. The means used 
in the deception were diverse. Duplicitous diplomatic communications xii , fake intelligence 
reportsxiii, and even entire fake units like Patton’s First United States Army Group, were used to 
signal these intentions to the German Army in preparation for Overlord.  
 
Misleading deceptions eliminate ambiguity and are eventually aimed at forcing incorrect 
action. Operation Fortitude South is cited by the NPS study as an example of an M-Type. 
Fortitude South was aimed at convincing the Germans that Allies were landing in Calais, 
significantly closer to Britain. Deception efforts here prevented the effective reinforcement by 
fixing German forces in northern France. Joint doctrine classifies these varieties as functions of 
MILDEC and adds three more. In addition to sowing ambiguity and misallocation, US doctrine 
says that MILDEC efforts may reveal enemy information, condition the enemy to friendly 
behavioral patterns, and cause the enemy to waste combat power.  
 
5. Deception in Cyberspace 
Deception is not limited to military operations or exclusively to any social context; it is a natural 
part of human interaction. Deception is deception wherever humans go, and its results are largely 
analogous. In the context of war, cyberdeception has largely the same intended outcomes as in 
the physical world – imposing cost to adversarial decision making and affording initiative to the 
defender.  
 
Deception in cyberspace has been a growing trend since the concept of the “honeypot” was 
described by the SANS Institute in 2000.xiv Generally, this honeypot is a computer specially 
configured to attract exploits. These are split further into categories by purpose: defense and 
research. Defensive honeypots aim to distract hackers from systems with value into a 
controllable and disposable environment. Research oriented honeypots attempt to gather 
information on exploits in order to facilitate study by security researchers. Recently, researchers 
have been seeking to fuse the two in an attempt to rapidly fingerprint malware and deploy 
signatures to perimeter defense – seeking to improve it by improving speed of mitigation. 
                                                          
3 Operations Fortitude North was part of Operation Bodyguard, the overarching deception plan supporting Operation 
Overlord in World War Two. 
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Although the adversary gains a foot-hold in the defenders’ space, the defender is able to mitigate 
vulnerabilities and change strategy more quickly. 
 
During the last decade in cyberspace, deception and information manipulation have evolved 
continually. Tools that were originally fairly simple and limited have kept pace with cyberspace 
more broadly. The simple honeypot which began in the mid-1990s has branched into many 
variants, each with a different shape and foci. For example, “CONPOT” attempts to clone 
industrial control system (ICS) environments; “Artillery” seeks to function as an early warning 
system, enticing attackers with open ports;xv “Kippo” focuses logging adversarial actions and 
techniques.xvi Each variant can impede adversarial progress or feed friendly decision making.    
 
From this basic concept, honeypots have continued to evolve into more sophisticated variants 
like the honeynet, wherein multiple honeypots are assembled to create a more realistic 
exploitable environment, and to the honeytoken, which are informational tokens used to 
demonstrate compromise. An example of a honeytoken would be a fictional persona, only 
existing in a particular dataset whose purpose is to reveal compromise of the data. If someone 
targeted the fictional persona with a spearphishing email it would feed friendly decision making 
and afford opportunity for what is later described as “misleading” deception.   
 
A key concept to implementation of honeypots is the idea of “interaction” with adversaries. 
This concept being roughly parallel with a traditional deception story. To have a credible 
honeypot it must look like a real victim machine. That is to say, fidelity is key to believability. 
Addressing this concern is increasingly becoming key to efficacy of deception in commercial 
defensive efforts. In Stuart and Leanne Hirshfield’s recent study for the Air Force Research 
Laboratory exploring the physiological responses of subjects to deception in cyberspace, they 
identify the concept of suspicion underlying that of interaction. They go on to propose a three-
stage model of this behavior (i.e. cues, filters, and outcomes) that may help guide eventual 
implementation of these concepts operationally.  
 
Interaction with these machines determines their credibility. Many computers are typically 
configured to respond to different questions (i.e. queries). Honeypots respond in the same way. 
“Interaction” defines what extent a hacker may interact with a given system before seeing that it 
is a honeypot.  Shodan, an “internet-of-things” search engine, has a tool that audits the credibility 
of honeypot implementations in much the same way, using queries to establish extent of 
interaction that a particular computer will allow.xvii  Unfortunately this same method can be used 
to assist in network reconnaissance. This highlights the importance of interaction and credibility 
in use of honeypots.  
 
Creation of environments with little to no credibility may also work to support the deception 
story. Virtual environments and virtual computers have had an interesting relationship with 
malware. Given past usage of virtual environments for a limited scope of specific forensic uses, 
malware has historically preferred not to deploy in these environments, preferring to use their 
“zero-day” exploits in production environments. This trend is reversing, but it still demonstrates 
that malware is capable of detecting low-fidelity virtualized environments.  
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6. Deception in the attack 
Part of the challenge in the use of deception defensively, is social. These techniques have been 
long associated with adversarial behaviors and subsequently shunned by network operators. 
Adversaries have employed deception to gain access to networks, sometimes using social 
manipulation (i.e. “social engineering,”) to establish credibility and trust. Such was the case with 
the 2011 compromise of RSA, a security provider whose products protected over 40 million 
customers xviii  The attack was launched by targeting an internal user with a semi-credible 
solicitation. Once the user opened the solicitation, its malicious contents executed, enabling 
eventual compromise of RSAs foundational security products.4 This does not mean that the 
attack was instantaneous, much like war in general: adversarial actors in a network deal with the 
“fog and friction” of uncertainty. Exploits like RSA may typically take months to progress as 
adversaries constantly adjust targets and approaches – tailoring them to their environment. 
 
Looking across this procedural chain, you can see that it is also vulnerable to defensive 
deception. Fake personas can impede effective targeting, high fidelity exploitable machines can 
deliver fake or harmful data to the adversary, low fidelity, high value machines can obfuscate 
location of important information, and data collection of this process can help identify 
adversarial aim. Neil Rowe of the Naval Postgraduate School demonstrated this conceptually in 
his 2007 study on manipulating network reconnaissance.  
 
 
Figure 1. Deception is used by hackers across almost every phase of the attack.xix Each information input affords 
opportunity to deceive attackers. 
 
                                                          
4 See Figure 1. 
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7. Deception in the defense 
Malware’s capacity to sense its place may be manipulated to confuse adversaries, as discussed 
above, with the cyber equivalent of camouflage (i.e. making valuable targets look less important 
and more generic). Using the framework of military deception, there are several tactics and 
techniques that may be employed in pursuit of defensive capability. Generally, they fall within 
the framework of military deception outlined above – working either toward ambiguity 
increasing (A-Type) or misleading (M-Type). However, use of A-type defensive deception may 
be the most viable in the short term.  
 
MITRE recently examined the implications of using M-Type deception in a paper titled 
“Denial and Deception in Cyber Defense.” Several salient points emerged. The first was that 
although misleading type deception can be more effective than ambiguity increasing deception, 
the institutional cost can be greater as well. In its paper, MITRE posits an eight-step deception 
process that seeks to create a functional M-Type deception. 5  This process is reliant on a 
“management model”xx not typically present in cyber operations. This is not to say that it cannot 
be created, or would be ineffective – on the contrary, it would be highly effective6 – but creation 
of such a mechanism comes a price.  In the interim, it may be easier to pursue ambiguity 
inducing deception. A-Type may still be used to sow ambiguity and imposer a steeper cost than 
is currently the case for advanced persistent threats (APTs). As explained above, effective 
conduct of action in cyberspace is difficult enough for an adversary at the moment. Attackers 
must spend considerable time conducting reconnaissance and figuring out what is worth 
attacking in the network and what their objective will be.  
 
Tactics available in Cyberdeception 
   Moving Target Defense  
Low Fidelity,  
High Value 
Systems 
Honeypots   Honeynets  Honeytokens 
Type  Ambiguity  Ambiguity  Ambiguity, Misleading 
Ambiguity, 
Misleading 
Ambiguity, 
Misleading 
Effect 
A ‐ 
Type 
A ‐ Increases 
required 
reconnaissance 
period, disrupt 
previous access 
A ‐ Requires 
greater scrutiny 
to determine 
legitimacy 
(better 
performance if 
concurrent with 
M‐Type Efforts) 
A ‐ Denial of 
attack vector 
(partial*) 
A ‐ Denial of 
attack vector 
(partial*) 
Cueing 
Effect 
M ‐ 
Type 
N/A  N/A 
M ‐ Active 
contributions to 
deception story 
M ‐ Active 
contributions 
to deception 
story 
Cueing 
* Depends on adversarial movement through network and detection  
                                                          
5 1. Define purpose, 2. Seek understanding of adversary, 3. Design cover story, 4. Plan friendly deception, 5. Prepare, 
6. Execute, 7. Monitor, and 8. Reinforce deception as needed. 
6 By virtue of using the deception process above M-type deception adheres to doctrinal Principals of Military 
Deception – i.e. Focus, Objective, Centralized Planning and Control, Security, Timeliness, and Integration  
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A-type deceptions offer numerous benefits to defenders with a minimal institutional cost. 
They may be planned into acquisition efforts and deployed through normal operation channels. 
A-Type deception seems to be “low hanging fruit.” It has a broad deception target because it 
aims to frustrate the adversarial operators, not planners. It doesn’t require the same level of 
coordination for the deception story since the story only aims to complicate the environment. 
Moreover, the A-Type, once more developed, would offer the defender the greatest agility in 
response.  
 
In the near term, cyberdeception will be limited principally to displays and demonstrations – 
that is to say, sowing ambiguity. Ruses and feints, however, will remain relatively unused at 
least for now.7With careful thought, resourcing, and ample planning, like that done by MITRE in 
their recent study, M-type deception may become feasible. It is important to realize these tactics 
may not remain relevant in the future. Incorporating deception into our strategy and doctrine, 
however, is merely embracing cyberspace as a human domain.  
 
Deception imposes cost on the adversary: cost in detecting the lie, cost in incorrect action, or 
cost of exposed intent. These effects translate well into cyberspace. Cyberdeception tactics 
should not be viewed as static solutions to a problem but rather part of an exchange with 
attackers. As is true in conventional conflict, tactics, techniques, and procedures change rapidly. 
Doctrine and strategy change much more slowly and this is where deception must be built. 
Employment of deception in cyberdefense as a doctrinal change will, as with human behavior, 
remain pertinent well into the future.   
 
8. Challenges 
As discussed above, credibility remains a key challenge to establishing a viable defensive 
deception campaign. If honeypots look like honeypots, no one will engage with them. Likewise, 
no one will want to interact on a virtualized defense platform if they realize they are in it. That 
being said, what other challenges might an organization face? Defining a valid target may be one, 
and where should we conduct this effort? How do we delineate target audiences for military 
deception? The question is one of distinction, and can be answered in observation of intent 
within the confines of organizational cyberspace. Cyber personas are by nature, ambiguous. 
Early internet culture valued anonymity above all else, and this proclivity has resulted in a social 
construct that blurs the link to the real world. Unauthorized access to US networks may afford 
the distinction required to delineate validity as a deception target, but this question will remain 
pertinent.  
 
Conclusion 
Within the departments and supporting agencies (i.e. the Services and the DoD) we have the 
resources to create a fairly robust deceptive effort. USSTRATCOM, the parent of both JFHQ-
DoDIN and USCYBERCOM, already has authority to conduct transregional MILDEC. Core 
Data Centers capable of virtualizing servers and handling large volumes of traffic, national cyber 
ranges that simulate operational terrain of the DoDIN, and a nascent national cyber mission force 
                                                          
7 Honeytokens may be categorized as a ruse, as it cues friendly forces to adversarial intent. 
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– including “Cyber Protection Teams”. All of these resources can be leveraged to provide a 
capable infrastructure that enables both active and passive deception. By leveraging our own 
networks in support of military deception, we may impose new costs and shape adversary action. 
Given the operationalization of M-Type deception in cyberdefense, stolen technologies could 
become liabilities and false situational templates could be laid, all of which complicate adversary 
decision calculus. Today, these options seem to be at our fingertips. In cyber operations, the only 
thing needed is doctrinal shift - a more mature understanding of the operational environment. We 
assume we can “dominate” our own networks. We cannot. We need a pragmatic doctrine that 
operates in today’s context. We will need deception if we are to fight for key cyber terrain.  
  
Why then, should we not adapt current war-fighting doctrine for cyber operations? We know 
that foreign actors access our networks and the information stored therein. We know that our 
perimeter defenses and sensors will be useless against state cyberforces in a war. The same 
pattern of exploitation has been happening in networks now for over 10 years – expecting 
perimeter security to improve will not make it so. Deception offers an additive defense.  
 
The case for employment of “A-Type” Deception in the network has been mounting for 
several years. A confluence of factors is now creating an imperative for the development and 
employment of this capability in the joint environment. The diminished efficacy of current 
defensive capability combined with a relatively unambiguous operational environment has 
created the perfect domain for the adversary in US cyberspace. If the USG does not deploy this 
capability, it will be caught flat footed in our next major conflict. 
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